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INSURANCE
I. POLICY CONsmUc ON CASES
In the case of 'Wilson v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,'
the plaintiffs were seeking to hold the insurer liable on default
judgments obtained against Elton Inabinet, Jr., the driver of
an automobile which was involved in a collision with the plain-
tiffs. The insurer had issued a liability insurance policy to
Elton Inabinet, Sr., which was in force and effect at the time
of the collision. Elton, Jr., at the time of the collision was
driving a car owned by one Rump, and the plaintiffs sought to
predicate liability on the "use of other automobiles" clause of
the policy issued to Elton, Sr.
The first problem with which the court had to contend was
whether Elton Inabinet, Jr. was an insured within the applica-
ble clause which defined the word insured as "(1) such named
insured and spouse and dependent children residing in the same
household. . . ." If Elton, Jr., were found to be an insured,
he would have to have been a dependent child residing in the
same household. The court as a matter of law determined that
Elton Inabinet, Jr., was married, employed, and living in an
apartment with his wife at the time of the collision and in addi-
tion was furnishing money to help support his parents' house-
hold. Therefore, he was found not to come within the policy
definition of "insured" and, accordingly, was not covered by his
father's liability policy.
As to the issue of dependency, the court quoted from its
opinion in Day v. Day2 where it held that a dependent is one
who looks to another for support and maintenance-one who
relies on another for the reasonable necessities of life. Insofar
as the requirement that the child be not only dependent but in
addition must reside in the same household, this is most often
a factual determination. There was evidence that in spite of
the fact that Elton Jr. lived in an apartment with his wife, he
did from time to time come to his parents' home on weekends.
The court, conceding that there was evidence of possible resi-
dency in his parents' home, nevertheless concluded that there
was no coverage because of the clear facts regarding the lack
of dependency.
1. 247 S.C. 310, 147 S.E2d 250 (1966).
2. 216 S.C. 334, 58 S.E2d 83 (1950).
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It should be noted that the definition of the term "insured"
as used in the policy involved in the instant case, differs slightly
from the definition of the same term as used in some other
policies and in the South Carolina Code. The code's definition
is:
[T]he named insured and, while resident of the same house-
hold, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of
either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any per-
son who uses, with the consent, expressed or implied, of the
named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy ap-
plies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the policy
applies or the personal representative of any of the above.3
It has recently been held that this definition applies not only to
the section of the automobile insurance code dealing with unin-
sured motorist coverage, but throughout the rest of the automo-
bile liability insurance policies mentioned and described in sec-
tion 46-750.32.4 In a case which came before the South Carolina
Supreme Court in 1965, this section was held to refer to two
classes of insureds, each having a specific period of coverage.5
In the instant case, Elton Jr. did not come within either class.
He did not fit the first because, although he -was a "relative"
as required by the statute, he did not reside in the same house-
hold as his parents. He did not come within the second because
he was not driving the motor vehicle designated as the insured
motor vehicle in his father's liability policy.
A second and more troublesome problem in the Wilson case
was raised by the plaintiff's contention that since the defend-
ants had certified coverage to the Highway Department after
the collision, they were barred by the doctrine of waiver,
estoppel or both from denying coverage at a later time. The
court recognized the minority position taken by the courts of
Wisconsin and Washington on this point that an insurer who
certifies coverage will later be barred by waiver or estoppel
3. S.C. CODE ANXr. § 46-750.31 (1962).
4. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 282, 147 S.E2d
273 (1966).
5. In Davidson v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 472, 141 S.E.2d
135 (1965) the court said that the language now contained in Section 46-
750.31, defining the term insured refers to two classes of insureds, each having
a specific period of coverage; the first of which is "the named insured, his
spouse and his or her relatives resident in the same household, while in a
motor vehicle or otherwise." The second is a permissive user and guest while
using the motor vehicle designated in the policy.
1967]
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from denying such coverage,6 even if such certification is made
by an insurer acting under a mistake of law 7 However, relying
principally on the fact that the certification form in this case
was filed not by the defendant insurer but by Elton Inabinet,
Sr., the named insured, and that the form indicated only that
Elton, Sr. was covered with no mention being made of Elton
Jr., the person involved in the accident, the South Carolina
court ruled against the plaintiff on this point also.
Worth noting here is the possibility of result had the insurer
certified coverage as to Elton Inabinet, Jr. Had this been the
case, the Wisconsin and Washington line of cases would clearly
have indicated the application of the doctrine of estoppel. There
is, however, highly persuasive authority for reaching the oppo-
site result. The rule, best stated by American Jurisprudence, is:
The rule is well established that the doctrines of implied
waiver and of estoppel, based upon the conduct or action of
the insurer, are not available to bring within the coverage
of a policy risks not covered by its terms, or risks expressly
excluded therefrom, and the application of the doctrines in
this respect is therefore to be distinguished from the waiver
of, or estoppel to assert, grounds of forfeiture. Thus, while
an insurer may be estopped by its conduct or its knowledge
from insisting upon a forfeiture of a policy, the coverage
or restrictions on the coverage, cannot be extended by the
doctrine of waiver or estoppel .... [T]he doctrine cannot be
involved to create a primary liability and bring within the
coverage of the policy risks not included or contemplated
by its terms.
8
One California case held that the doctrine of waiver could
not be invoked to reform a contract so as to create liability for
conditions which are specifically excluded.9 The supreme
6. E.g., LaPoint v. Richards, 66 Wash. 2d 550, 403 P.2d 889 (1965) ; Beh-
ringer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Wis. 586, 82 N.W2d 915 (1957);
Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis. 247, 73 N.W.2d 587 (1955).
7. Prisuda v. General Cas. Co. of America, 272 Wis. 41, 74 N.W.2d 777
(1956).
8. 29A Am. Ju. Insurance § 1135 (1960). Accord, Campbell v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 211 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1954); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas,
250 F. Supp. 204 (D.S.C. 1966).
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courts of both North Carolina'0 and Virginia" have expressly
ruled that the filing of a certificate of financial responsibility
on a policy issued voluntarily' 2 does not of itself effect an
estoppel to deny coverage. Agreeing with these decisions the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently said that it is a well
settled rule of law that the principles of estoppel and implied
waiver do not operate to extend the coverage of an insurance
policy after the liability has been incurred or loss sustained.'3
In the Virginia Farm Bureau case the court pointed out that
had there been an intention to make liability of the insurer
absolute upon filing of the statement of financial responsibility,
the legislature would surely have so stated.14 To the general
rule there appears to be only one exception, that being the
case where a liability insurer with knowledge of a ground for
denying coverage certifies coverage and undertakes uncondi-
tionally the defense of an action brought against its insured.
Such action by the insurer constitutes a waiver of the terms of
the policy and gives rise to an estoppel of the insurer to assert
the grounds for denial of coverage.' 5 In Laird v. Nationwide
Ins. Co.,16 the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that in
formulating our uninsured motorist act, Virginia's act was used
as a model. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that if and
when South Carolina is presented with the issue of whether an
insurer's filing of an SR-22 form will thereafter estop or,
10. In the case of Seaford v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 235 N.C. 719, 117
S.E_2d 733, the court said that the required filing of an SR-21 does not show
a legislative intent that such act creates a contract between the insurer and
the insured or in any way affects their contractual rights. The better rule
seems to be that by the mere filing of an SR-21 form as required by the law
of this state, the insured is not later estopped to deny coverage under the
policy.
11. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d
268 (1963). The court did point out that where a financial responsibility form
is filed on a policy issued to an assigned risk, liability becomes absolute, not
because of filing the form, but rather because of the strict state policy regard-
ing assigned risk policies.
12. The term "voluntarily" is used simply to distinguish between a policy
issued to one who buys insurance because he wants it as opposed to one who,
after having an accident, buys insurance to satisfy the provisions of our
Uninsured Motorist Act requiring proof of financial responsibility.
13. Insurance Co. of No. America v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 769
(4th Cir. 1964).
14. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d
268 (1963).
15. Insurance Co. of No. America v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 769
(4th Cir. 1964). Accord, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 191
Va. 225, 60 S.E.2d 876 (1950). See generally 29A Am. JuR. Insuratice
§ 1465 (1960).
16. 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
1967]
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through waiver, prevent him from denying coverage, the South
Carolina court will adopt the view espoused by Virginia and the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In the case of Williams v. Pennsyhvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.,
1 7
the insured's automobile was stolen and was thereafter involved
in an accident with a third party. The third party attached the
vehicle under section 45-551 of the South Carolina Code and
obtained an in rem judgment against it. The insured entered
into a contract with the third party and obtained a release of
the automobile from attachment. When demand was made on
the insurer for the amount, the insured had already paid for the
release. The insurer denied coverage, contending that the in-
sured was obligated to pay under any in rem judgment agree-
ment.
When faced with a similar situation under an identical clause
in a policy which obligated the insurer to "pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of
property" the South Carolina Supreme Court, in the case of
Sexton v. Hawleysville Mut. Ins. Co.1s held that the provision
did not cover in rem judgment agreements. The policy in this
case, as well as the one involved in Sexton, provided that no
action should lie against the company until the "insured's obli-
gation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judg-
ment against the insured after actual trial or by written agree-
ment of the insured, the claimant and the company." The court
in Secoton held that a judgment in rem did not operate in per-
sonam or create any personal liability.
The appellant in Williams conceded that if nothing but the
policy provisions were considered by the court, the respondents
would have no responsibility in his case. However, the appel-
lant contended that the policy did not comply with section 46-
750.3210 of the South Carolina Code and that the requirements
of that statute must be read into and become part of the insur-
17. 246 S.C. 396, 143 S.E.2d 797 (1965).
18. 242 S.C. 182, 130 S.E.2d 475 (1963).
19. This section provides that:
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance or of prop-
erty damage insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance or use of any motor vehicle shall be issued or delivered in
this State . . . unless it contains a provision insuring the persons defined
as insured against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor
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ance contract between the parties. The court held, however, that
the lien against the appellant's automobile under section 45-551
was not within the coverage afforded the appellant under sec-
tion 46-750.32 as this section protected the insured against loss
from liability imposed by law while section 45-551 imposed no
personal liability but related only to the automobile.
Mr. Justice Bussey, in a well reasoned and most logical dis-
sent,20 pointed out that in Sexton no statutory question had been
raised and that the case turned solely on the provisions of the
policy. In his dissent he said that section 46-750.32, which pro-
vides that the insured is protected against "loss," should not be
restricted to loss from the payment of an in personem judgment
but should include all loss arising out of liability imposed by
law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of the vehicle. He also made an excellent point in saying
that section 45-551 was enacted forty years prior to the Motor
Safety Responsibility Act 21 but that it is in para materia with
that act in that they are both designed to protect persons injured
or damaged through the negligent operation or use of automo-
biles. In his view, the legislature when they passed the Safety
Responsibility Act must have been cognizant of the fact that
loss of a person's automobile under the procedure provided by
section 45-551 would be a loss imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle.
The case of Fulbright v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. 22 involved a suit
by a widow to recover the cost of her husband's funeral from an
insurer. The deceased had been a truck driver and had died
from injuries sustained while driving the truck furnished by his
employer for his regular use. Deceased and his wife were in-
sured by the defendant under a policy which covered their two
cars. The policy in part provided:
Coverage C-Medical Payments
To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year
from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical,
X-Ray and dental services including prosthetic devices, and
necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and
funeral services:
20. Mr. Justice Bussey also entered an excellent dissenting opinion in the
Sexton case.
21. This act is contained in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-701 to -856 (1962).
22. 247 S.C. 226, 146 S.E2d 618 (1966).
1967]
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Division 1. To or for the named insured and each rela-
tive who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, includ-
ing death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily
injury" caused by accident, while occupying or through
being struck by an automobile ...
Exclusions-This policy does not apply to bodily injury:
.... (b) sustained by the named insured or a relative
(1) while occupying an automobile owned by or furnished
for the regular use of either the named insured or any rela-
tive, other than an automobile defined herein as an "owned
automobile."
The appellant's first contention was that the exclusionary
clause applied only to an automobile furnished for the regular
use of the "named insured" and the named insured was two per-
sons under the terms of the policy, but the vehicle was furnished
only to one person-the deceased. Appellant relied on Baxley
v. State Fanva Mut. Auto Liab. I=. Co. 23 for this contention. In
that case Mr. Baxley owned a Buick in his name; his wife owned
a Chrysler in her own name. The insurance policy provided that
the word "insured" included both Baxley and his wife. It also
provided that funeral expenses would be provided for his burial
in the event that he was killed in a "Temporary Substitute Auto-
mobile" and defined such an automobile as one "not owned by the
named insured .... " Mr. Baxley's Buick was being repaired
and he was killed while driving his wife's car. In holding the
insurer liable for Baxley's funeral expenses the court said:
The definition of "named insured" in the policy, and under
the circumstances here involved, simply had the effect of
making "the named insured" two people instead of one.
Since it is conceded that the Chrysler automobile was not
owned by Mr. Baxley, nor by Mr. and IvMrs. Baxley jointly,
but only by Mrs. Baxley, it was "not owned by the named
insured" and was covered as a temporary substitute auto-
mobile under the provisions of the policy.
24
The court in Fulbright, however, limited Baxley to its facts,
noting that to hold the term "named insured" wherever appear-
ing to mean both husband and wife would lead to absurd re-
sults and held this ground of appeal to be without merit. The
23. 241 S.C. 332, 128 S.E.2d 165 (1962).
24. Id. at 335, 128 S.E.2d at 166.
7
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court also dismissed the appellant's second contention regarding
ambiguity in the medical payments coverage clause and the
exclusionary clause discussed above.
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Surety Indem. Co. 25 presented
the South Carolina Supreme Court with a new policy provision
interpretation problem.
In this case the car owner, Mr. Delaney, needed some repair
work done on his car. He arranged with a garage owner, Mr.
Jeter, to have the latter drive him to work in Delaney's car and
then drive the car back to the garage where it could be worked
on. On the way back to the garage, Jeter was involved in a
collision. Delaney was insured under a policy issued by the
defendant which specifically excluded coverage of "an owned
automobile while used in the automobile business" and defined
"automobile business" as "the business or occupation of selling,
repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles."
Jeter was insured by a garage liability policy issued by the
plaintiff. A claim against Jeter arose out of the accident and
was settled with the party by the plaintiff and defendant. They
subsequently disagreed as to the coverage afforded Jeter under
their respective policies. As a result, the plaintiff instituted a
declaratory judgment action, the parties stipulating the basic
facts and, in addition, stipulating that Jeter was covered by the
garage liability policy and that there was no issue of primary
or secondary coverage. The parties in essence agreed that the
unsuccessful party of the suit would provide coverage up to the
limits of his policy and would reimburse the other for the share
paid in the settlement. The issue would be resolved by a deter-
mination of whether Delaney's automobile was being used in the
automobile business within the meaning of the exclusion in De-
laney's policy, for, as the parties admitted, Jeter was an insured
under that policy and therefore primarily covered by it unless
his use came within the ambit of the exclusion. The lower court,
sitting without a jury, found for the plaintiff concluding, as a
matter of fact, that Jeter was not using Delaney's automobile in
the "automobile business" at the time of the collision and that
the defendant's policy afforded coverage. The supreme court
noting the novelty of the question in South Carolina, but finding
25. 246 S.C. 220, 143 S.E.2d 371 (1965).
19671
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ample authority in other jurisdictions, 26 affirmed. The court
stated that these cases, in interpreting an exclusionary clause
of this type, refer to the use being made of the car and not the
occupation of the driver. It pointed out that the issue is
essentially one of fact which must be resolved with regard to
the nature of the particular business and the circumstances sur-
rounding the use at the time of the collision. The court then
noted that the record showed that Jeter was not in the habit of
transporting cars to his garage for repairs but was maling a
special effort to accommodate Delaney. This was, to the court,
ample proof that the car was not being used in the automobile
business.
The case of ,Sims v. Nationwide Hut. Ins. C0.27 involved a
suit by an insured judgment debtor against his insurer to
recover on a judgment declared against the insured in a prior
tort action in which the insurer refused to defend the insured.
The ground for insurer's refusal to defend and his defense in
this action was that the injuries for which the insured was sued
were intentionally inflicted by him. The insured's position was
that in view of the fact that he had merely been found negZigent
in the prior action against him by the injured third party, the
fact that the insurer had refused to defend him in that action
now precluded him from asserting that insured's actions were
intentional; or, in essence, that the insurer was bound by the
court's decree as to the insured's degree of culpability. The
trial court agreed with the insured and so held.
In reversing, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized
the general rule that where an insurance company has notice
and opportunity to defend an action against its insured, the
company is bound by pertinent material facts established
against its insured, whether it appears in defense of the action
or not. However, the court ruled that this proposition applies
only where the interests of the insurer and insured in opposing
the injured person's claim are identical.2s The court quoting
from Farmn Bureau Nut. Ins. Co. v. Hammenr 2 9 said that the
26. E.g., Hamner v. Malkerson Motors Inc., 269 Minn. 563, 132 N.W.2d
174 (1964) ; Case v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 105 N.H. 422, 201 A.2d 897 (1964).
See generally 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcTICE, § 4372 (Supp.
1965); 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance (1963).
27. 247 S.C. 82, 145 S.E.2d 523 (1965).
28. Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962);
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949).
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general rule did not extend to matters outside the scope of the
insurance contract and that the insurer is neither obligated to
defend the insured nor is he bound by the decision of the court
if the claim against the insured is not covered by the provisions
of the policy. The insurance contract in this case contained a
clause saying in effect that the company would afford the in-
sured no protection for any injury caused intentionally by him
or at his direction.
The court realized here that application of the general rule
would put the insurer in an impossible situation, in that it could
not have possibly defended the tort action against the insured
while at the same time protecting its own interest. If it tried
to defend by showing an intentional injury, it might well expose
the insured to greater liability than the court actually found.
If it had urged an unintentional injury, it would have foregone
its position taken under the exclusionary provision of the
policy.30 The court therefore concluded that it was not possible
for the company in these suits to defend the insured and at the
same time protect its own interests. The insurer and the insured
had taken different positions on a vital point and the insurer
acted properly in refusing to defend the insured in the action
by the injured third party. Therefore, the insurer was not bound
by the court's decree in the tort action as to the defendant's
degree of culpability, but rather it was free to assert its policy
defenses in this action on the insurance contract.
The case of Pickens v. State Farm, Mut. Ins. (o.31 involved
a controversy over coverage during a "grace period." The
deceased insured had an automobile liability policy with a death
indemnity provision. The insured was notified that his premium
was due on March 2, 1961, but no specific time of that day was
mentioned. On or about March 2, the insured having failed to
forward his premium was sent a notice of expiration which
stated that the policy expired at 12:01 A. M. on the due date.
On this same notice, however, was printed, "Payment within
ten days of the due date will renew your policy and provide
continuous protection." At approximately 1:00 A. M. on Sun-
day, March 12, 1961, the insured was killed in an automobile
accident. On the following day, one of the deceased's relatives
30. See Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962).
31. 246 S.C. 380, 144 S.E.2d 68 (1965).
19671
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tendered the premium, but it was refused, the agent saying that
it was a day too late.
Upon suit the trial court refused the defendant insurer's mo-
tions for nonsuit, directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. from
which rulings the insurer appealed. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina affirmed the lower court holding that the lan-
guage of the expiration notice indicated an intent on the part
of the insurer to give the insured time through March 12 in
which to tender his premium and that continuous coverage
would be afforded him during this ten day grace period pro-
vided that payment be made by midnight March 12. As to pay-
ment not being tendered until the following day, the court held
under established precedent 32 that since March 12 the extended
due date fell on a Sunday, the tender of the premium was made
in due time. Besides the circumstances of this particular case,
there was another factor which was important in the court's
decision that is best described in an earlier South Carolina case
which quoted from Corpus Juris: "A forfeiture for nonpay-
ment of premium is not favored in the law, and the courts are
prompt to seize upon circumstances which indicate an election
to waive the forfeiture."33
There had been evidence offered in the earlier case by the
plaintiff to the effect that the insurer had, in the past, accepted
late premiums from the insured and had continued his coverage.
The court also noted that an insurer had a clear right to extend
the payment of any premium due.34 These factors, coupled with
the language in the expiration notice, gave the court ample
reason for allowing the lower court's verdict to stand.
II. UNINSUED MOTORIST CASES
The case of Squires v. NationaZ Grange Hut. Ins. Co.35 in-
volved a suit by administrators of deceased insureds against an
automobile liability insurer on the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment. The three decedents, whose administrators later brought
suit, along with three others were*killed when the insured auto-
mobile in which they were riding collided head-on with one of
three other insured vehicles which were engaged in a race. The
32. Linfors v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 189 S.C. 527, 1 S.E.2d 781 (1939).
33. Welch v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 494, 501, 180 S.E. 447,
450 (1935).
34. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 286 (1945).
35. 247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d 673 (1965).
11
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accident occurred on May 13, 1961. The three administrators
filed suit in September 1961 for wrongful death against the
three who had been racing. Kennedy, one of the defendants
entered into a covenant not to sue with the three plaintiffs. On
April 24, 1962, the estate of Effie Johnson, one of the deceased
insureds, secured judgment against the remaining two defend-
ants. It appeared that sometime between the date of the collision
and the day before the trial, the insurer of the remaining two
defendants, Sessions and Hartley, denied coverage to Sessions
because he had made false statements in his application. On
April 23, the day before the trial of the suit brought on behalf
of the estate of Effie Johnson against Sessions and Hartley,
counsel for the plaintiffs wrote National Grange Mutual, who
had issued the policy on the car in which deceased had been
killed, notifying them that the defendant's insurer had denied
coverage as to Sessions. On the next day, as noted previously,
judgment was obtained on behalf of Effie Johnson's estate
against both remaining defendants. On May 1, 1962, National
Grange denied any uninsured motorist coverage because they
contended that the plaintiffs had violated a condition of the
policy whereby the plaintiffs were to forward suit papers to
them immediately upon institution of the suits and further they
contended that Sessions was not an uninsured motorist. How-
ever, the judgment rendered against Sessions was not appealed.
The actions on behalf of the other two deceased's estates were
tried in December 1962 at which time default judgments were
rendered against both Sessions and Hartley in favor of the two
plaintiffs. Both of these defendants had been insured by the
same carrier, but as mentioned previously, coverage had been
denied Sessions. Further, Hartley received no representation
from the insurer because prior to December 1962, the insurer
had been placed in receivership, and the attorneys representing
Hartley had been allowed to withdraw. After establishing lia-
bility and the amount of damages against Sessions and Hartley,
the plaintiffs sued National Grange on its uninsured motorist
indorsement. The defendant denied liability on the ground that
the plaintiff had not given notice of his claim under the unin-
sured motorist endorsement "as soon as practicable" nor had
they forwarded copies of suit papers "immediately" as required
by conditions in the endorsement. The defendant alleged that
the plaintiffs had not forwarded suit papers until April 23,
19671
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1962, at which time Sessions was in default and the insurance
carrier for Hartley was in receivership and unable to respond
to judgment, all to the prejudice of the defendant. The trial
court determined that the defendant was liable under its unin-
sured motorist endorsement for a sum not to exceed $10,000 on
the judgment against Sessions to each of the two plaintiffs.
The defendant appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court
on the grounds that (1) the policy provisions regarding notice
and forwarding of suit papers had not been complied with and
(2) that the lower court was in error in not setting a fixed
amount of damages.
In deciding on the appellant's first contention, the court relied
on a recent South Carolina case86 and held that the status of a
motorist as insured or uninsured is determined not as of the
date of the collision but as of the date when the driver's insurer
denies coverage. The court pointed out that it had held in the
past that words such as "as soon as practicable" meant simply
within a reasonable time.37 Further, the appellant had received
notice of the fact that the suit against Sessions was a claim
against an uninsured motorist within a reasonable time after the
respondents had become aware that Sessions' insurance carrier
had denied coverage. It should be noted that this suit had been
instituted prior to the 1963 amendments to the Uninsured Motor-
ist Act which considerably clarified the requirements a plaintiff
had to meet before proceeding against an uninsured motorist in
a suit to determine liability and damages, which he must do
before proceeding ex contractu against his insurance carrier on
the uninsured motorist endorsement.3 8 At this time there was
no definite procedure by which an insurance carrier could
defend the uninsured motorist in the action ex delicto brought
36. North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964).
37. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 376, 104 S.E.2d 673
(1958); Edgefield Mfg. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 S.C. 73, 58 S.E. 969
(1907). However, where the insurance contract specifies a time within which
notice must be given or suit papers forwarded, the insured must comply with
the specified time. Free v. United Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 178 S.C. 317, 182
S.E. 754 (1935); Levan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 S.C. 253, 136
S.E. 304 (1927).
38. Recovery under the Uninsured Motorist Act is subject to the condition
that the insured establish liability on the part of the uninsured motorist
Such an action is ex delicto and the only issues to be determined therein are
the liability and the amount of damage. After judgment is entered against the
uninsured motorist, a direct action ex contractu can be brought to recover
from the insurance company on its endorsement, and policy defenses may be
properly raised by the insurance company. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243
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by the insured.39 Section 46-750.18 did provide, however, that
"nor may anything be required of the insured except the estab-
lishment of legal liability." Under this statute and the policy
provision requiring notice as soon as practicable, the court could
easily have held that all that the insured was required to do was
give notice to his insurer within a reasonable time after he
found that the other party was "uninsured." The fact that such
notice came after the other party was in default, or even pos-
sibly after the issues of liability and damages had already been
determined, both of which would be highly prejudicial to the
insurer, would be of no consequence. All that mattered was that
the insured gave notice within a reasonable time after he learned
that the other party was uninsured. The supreme court, in
Hatchett 'v. Nationwide Nut. Ins. Go.,40 recognizing the unjust-
ness in this, said of 46-750.18: "[T]he legislature never intended
by this language to hold an insurance company liable without
notice or opportunity to investigate or contest the claim."
Any possibility of such a result was eliminated in 1963 by
enactment of section 46-750.33. 4 1 Upon reading Squires it may
at first seem that the court completely abandoned its position
as to the legislative intent behind section 46-750.18 in that notice
that Sessions was uninsured was received on April 28, 1962, and
his liability to one of the plaintiffs was established on April 24,
1962; however, one must remember that this is not the case
which was appealed. The case appealed from was heard in
December 1962, over seven months after notice was received.
As to the appellants contention regarding the respondent's
failure to comply with the condition requiring immediate for-
warding of suit papers, it should be noted that the word
39. In Hatchett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 432, 137 S.E2d
608, 612 (1964), the court, speaking of section 46-750.18 said:
[Tihe statute was completely silent on the procedure available to an
insurance company to defend a claim under the Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement of the policy. It did not prohibit the insurance company
from appearing in behalf of the alleged negligent uninsured motorist,
neither did the statute spell out the appropriate procedure to be followed
in such case.
40. 244 S.C. 425, 434, 137 S.E2d 608, 612 (1964).
41. This section provides:
No action shall be brought under the uninsured motorist provision
unless copies of the pleadings in the action establishing such liability are
served in the manner provided by law upon the insurance carrier writing
such uninsured motorist provision. The insurance carrier shall have the
right to appear and defend in the name of the uninsured motorist in any
action which may affect its liability, and shall have twenty days after
service of process on it in which to make such appearance.
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"immediate" used in this sense has been interpreted to mean
with reasonable promptness.4 2 As with the notice requirement,
the court held that the reasonable time issue was to be computed
as of the date the motorist became uninsured, not as of the date
of the collision or the date suit was instituted. Again the court
pointed out that there was no reason to believe that the papers
had not been forwarded within a reasonable time after the re-
spondent found that Sessions was uninsured. The court went
on to say that not only must the appellant show that the papers
were not promptly forwarded but they must also show that
such a failure on the plaintiff's part substantially prejudiced
the insurance carrier. The two cases cited by the court for the
proposition that prejudice must be shown, 43 involve the "cooper-
ation clause" of the liability policy which is totally distinct
from the "forwarding of suit papers" clause. The clear weight
of authority in South Carolina is in favor of the proposition
that failing properly to forward suit papers requires no showing
of prejudice, but rather in and of itself affords the insurer a
complete defense. 44  The court obviously either intended to
change the law or confused the two clauses.
As to the damages issue on appeal, the court held that the
trial should have set the amount of damages specifically and
not just a maximum amount.
The case of Morrow v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co.4 5 involved
a most unusual question of uninsured motorist coverage. In
this case, the minor son of the plaintiff was killed when the
"Go-Kart", which he was riding on a track designed for this
purpose, left the track and hit an ice cream truck parked nearby.
The truck was not registered or licensed as a mobile vehicle and
was being used at the track for selling ice cream. The plaintiff
sued the track owner charging him with various negligent and
reckless acts, among them furnishing unsafe equipment to
minors and allowing the truck to be placed so close to a track
with no guard rail. None of the allegations, however, charged
the track owner as the owner or operator of the truck. The
42. Edgefield Mfg. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 S.C. 73, 58 S.E. 969 (1907).
43. Crook v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241
(1960); Pharr v. Canal Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.2d 394 (1958).
44. Free v. United Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 178 S.C. 317, 182 S.E. 754
(1935). See Hatchett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d
608 (1964); Boyle Road & Bridge Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 195
S.C. 397, 115 S.E.2d 438 (1940).
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owner of the ice cream truck was also sued. The track owner
defaulted but the truck owner who contested the action received
a verdict in his favor. Both defendants were uninsured and
American Mutual, the plaintiff's insurer, was apprised of the
fact but declined to appear on behalf of either defendant. After
receiving judgment against the race track owner, the plaintiff
sued his insurer under the uninsured motorist endorsement of
his policy. The lower court held that there had been no allega-
tion nor had there been any evidence offered to show that the
track owner was guilty of any negligence with respect to the
ownership or operation of the ice cream truck, and since this was
the only vehicle mentioned in the complaint against the insurance
company, there was no ground for recovery under the unin-
sured motorist endorsement. 46  The plaintiff then moved to
amend his complaint so that he could proceed on the basis that
the "Go-Kart," which was owned by the track owner, was an
uninsured motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute. The
court denied the motion, expressing the view that the "Go-Kart,"
being operated as an amusement device on a private track,
although uninsured, was nevertheless not an uninsured motor
vehicle under the statute.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the holding of the
trial court as to the ice cream truck and noted that the result
would have been the same even had the plaintiff been permitted
to amend his complaint and allege negligent ownership or opera-
tion of the "Go-Kart." The effect of the court's ruling in this
case was in keeping with the legislative intent and purpose of
the Uninsured Motorist Act which is to provide benefits and
protection against the peril of injury by an uninsured motorist,
i.e., owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, to an
insured motorist, his family and permissive users of his vehicle.47
The track owner here simply did not come within the class pro-
tected against, and the court refused to extend the Uninsured
Motorist Act to cover this type of accident.
46. Section 46-750.33 which is applicable here provides: No such policy
or contract shall be so issued or delivered unless it contains a pro-
vision by endorsement or otherwise, herein referred to as the unin-
sured motorist provision, undertaking to pay the insured all sums
which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle ...
47. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
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III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES
In Toole v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,48 the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was presented with a question of
South Carolina Law which had never been passed upon by our
supreme court. In this case the insurer had issued a liability
policy in November 1960. In December 1960 the policy was
cancelled for failure to pay the premiums. In February 1961
the driver to whom the policy had been issued was involved in
an accident with the plaintiff. In this action the plaintiff con-
tended that the cancellation, although effective between the
insurer and the insured, was not effective as to him because the
insurer had not complied with section 46-138 of the South Caro-
lina Code.49 The trial court held that the policy was effectively
cancelled as to everyone saying: "The language of section 46-138
providing for notice to be given to the Department after a can-
cellation for a voluntary policy makes it clear that the cancella-
tion of such policy is not conditional upon the statutory notice
to the Highway Department." 0
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the court below, point-
ing out that the district court was correct in saying that the
plaintiff could not rely on section 46-750.2651 which sets out the
more stringent rules regarding cancellation of a certified policy.
The court, considering the legislative history of section 46-138
said: "We cannot find in the statute which applies to this case
any intention of the legislature that the policy should remain in
effect as to the general public until the 5 days notice was
given.11
52
The basic difference, of course, is in the purpose of the two
statutes. In South Carolina, a driver is not compelled to have
liability insurance. Under the Uninsured Motorist Act, he has
the option of paying fifty dollars into a fund and operating his
48. 353 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1965).
49. This section provides that upon termination of insurance by cancellation
or failure to renew, notice shall be filed with the Highway Department within
five days following the effective date of the cancellation or other termination.
50. Toole v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D.S.C. 1965)
(Emphasis added.)
51. This section requires that a certified policy cannot be cancelled or
terminated unless the insurer gives at least 10 days notice to the Highway
Department before cancellation or termination. South Carolina Highway
Department form 402 prohibits cancellation of a certified policy for failure to
pay premiums for a period of at least ninety days following the filing of an
SR-22 certification of financial responsibility.
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car as an uninsured motorist, Of course, he may buy liability
insurance on his own volition if he so desires. If he does his
insurance is classed as voluntary or non-certified and its can-
cellation comes within the ambit of section 46-138, the purpose
of which is to give the Highway Department notice that this
motorist is no longer insured. The Department will then compel
the motorist to pay the required fee or else surrender his regis-
tration and tags.
However, under the Safety Responsibility Act of 1952, a
motorist who has an accident or whose license has been revoked
is required by law 3 to furnish proof of financial responsibility,
if he wishes to continue to drive. One of the methods of fur-
nishing such proof is to produce a certificate of liability insur-
ance." This is termed a certified policy and its cancellation is
governed by section 46-750.26. The court made it clear that in
its eyes, the legislative intent and purpose of section 46-750.26
was altogether different from that of section 46-138, and that
the law regarding the termination or cancellation of a policy
covered by one section could not be applied to a termination or
cancellation of a policy covered by the other.
The court noted that there were no South Carolina cases con-
struing section 46-138 but pointed out that both North Carolina
and New York, which have similar statutes, have held that
neither defective notice55 nor failure to give any notice5" affects
the validity of the cancellation.
In Grain Dealers Mut. In8. (Co. v. JvlianP. the South Carolina
Supreme Court was first faced with the problem of determining
who was the legal owner of an automobile before making a
subsequent determination as to which of two insurance com-
panies would have to bear certain expenses which arose out of
a collision. The action came before the court in a declaratory
judgment suit.
The following is a brief summary of the facts: Prior to
Christmas 1961, Davis, upon giving his father-in-law, Brissey,
a late model car, took Brissey's older model Plymouth in
return. Brissey subsequently gave Davis a bill of sale for
the Plymouth and thereafter exercised no incident of own-
53. S.C. CODE ANx. § 4-46 (1962).
54. S.C. CODE ANI. § 46-747 (1962).
55. Levinson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297 (1963).
56. Kyer v. General Cas. Co. of America, 14 App. Div. 2d 649, 218
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1961).
57. 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965).
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ership over the car. Davis sold the Plymouth to Julian in
January 1962 for an agreed sum of 300 dollars, and Julian
executed a chattel mortgage creating a lien in favor of Davis
and agreed to pay the sale price in twenty-five weekly install-
ments of twelve dollars each. Davis gave Julian the 1961
registration card, the 1962 card having been lost by Brissey.
Davis also prepared a bill of sale which Julian picked up
later. Julian paid off the note and the chattel mortgage was
given back to him. In June 1962 Julian was involved in an
accident out of which several suits against him arose. The
injured parties at the time of the collision were covered by a
policy issued by Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. The policy,
of course, had an uninsured motorist provision. Julian carried
a "non-owners policy" with Grain Dealers Mutual which con-
tained a provision that coverage would not be afforded to any
automobile owned by the named insured. Apparently, at the
time of the accident, Julian had not yet procured a certificate
of title as required by law.58 This, of course, meant that
the title to the car was still in Brissey's name even though
Julian had bought, paid for and driven the car for some six
months. Lumberman's Mutual, the insurance carrier for the
injured parties, contended that Julian's failure to comply with
the Certificate of Title Law, under section 46-150.1559 of the
South Carolina Code, forced the conclusion that Julian was not
legally the owner of the car and, therefore, was covered by the
policy issued to him by Grain Dealers Mutual. Grain Dealers
contended that regardless of whether Julian had complied with
the Certificate of Title law, he nevertheless was the true and
legal owner of the car, and that therefore they had acted prop-
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150 (1962). This section provides in § 46-150.15:
How voluntary transfer carried out; when transfer effective.-If an
owner, manufacturer or dealer transfers his interest in a vehicle other
than by the creation of a security interest, he shall, at the time of the
delivery of the vehicle, execute an assignment and warranty of title to
the transferee in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the
Department prescribes and cause the certificate and assignment to be
mailed or delivered to the transferee or the Department
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, the transferee shall, promptly after
delivery to him of the vehicle, execute the application for a new certifi-
cate of title in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the
Department prescribes and cause the certificate to be mailed or delivered
to the Department.
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, and as between the parties, a
transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section
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erly in denying coverage for the injury inflicted by his alleged
negligent driving.
What the court had to decide was whether section 46-150.15
had to be strictly complied with as the exclusive procedure by
which title to a vehicle could be passed, or whether it was merely
a regulatory measure not establishing an exclusive method for
the transfer of legal title. The court recognized that there is a
split of authority in jurisdictions having similar statutes but
cited a fourth circuit case60 which held that the words "except...
as between the parties" modified the other provisions of section
46-150.15, and strict compliance was not necessary to transfer
ownership. The court also relied on a recent South Carolina
case 6' which held that the presumption of ownership which
arose from possession of title could be overcome by evidence
showing the true owner to be one other than the person whose
name appears on the title.
In Grain Dealers the court held that even though Julian did
not have the title certificate to the Plymouth, he nevertheless
was the legal owner. Thus the court followed what can be
termed the majority rule, holding that the statute was merely
a policy measure that is regulatory in nature.
It would appear that in view of the decision rendered in
Clouse v. American Hut. Liab. Ins. 0o.62 by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, there is a conflict between that court and the
South Carolina Supreme Court on the point decided in the
Grain Dealers case. In Clouse, which was heard prior to the
Grain Dealers decision, the Fourth Circuit Court noted with
regret that the Supreme Court of South Carolina had not had
an opportunity to pass on the question before them. Clouse
involved a situation where a dealer sold a car to an uninsured
motorist, but the dealer failed to forward the buyer's applica-
tion for a certificate of title as required of a dealer by section
46-150.16.68 The buyer was involved in an accident with the
60. Lynch v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 327 F.2d 328 (4th
Cir. 1964).
61. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964).
62. 344 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1965). See generally 18 S.C.L. REv. 78 (1966).
63. This section, as mentioned, applies to dealers as opposed to private
parties and provides:
Same; when dealer purchases vehicle for re-sale.-If a dealer buys a
vehicle and holds it for resale and procures the certificate of title from
the owner within ten days after delivery to him of the vehicle, he need
not send the Certificate to the Department, but, upon transferring the
vehicle to another person other than by creation of a security interest,
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plaintiff, who, being unable to recover adequately from the
buyer, sued the seller's insurer under a garage liability policy.
The buyer contended that the seller's failure to comply with the
above mentioned statute continued him as the owner of the car
and subjected his insurer to liability under the omnibus clause
of its liability policy which covered any automobile owned by
the insured. The district court held for the defendant insurer
stating that since there was authority for the proposition that a
certificate of title was not conclusive of ownership, the court
was not bound to reason that lack of title was conclusive that
legal ownership was in another. 4 On appeal, the district court
was overruled, the circuit court saying:
We think section 46-150.16 when considered in conjunction
with the other sections of the South Carolina Motor Vehicle
Registration and Licensing Act and particularly section 46-
150.15 indicates a legislative intent to hold the transfer [of
ownership] ineffectual, certainly to the extent necessary to
hold the insurance carrier [of the seller] liable . . . unless
there is compliance with its terms by the dealer transfer. 5
Though the court was dealing with a factual situation dif-
ferent from that in the Grain Dealers case, the statutes involved
were very similar, and the legislative purpose and intent as-
cribed to one would of necessity be ascribed to the other. The
court in Clouse did make the statement that:
We have no doubt but that [the buyer] was the principal
owner and was certainly primarily liable, but we simply
hold that [the seller's] failure to comply with the affirma-
tive obligation placed upon him by the South Carolina
statute also makes his insurance carrier financially respons-
ible for the plaintiff's judgment. 6
shall promptly execute the assignment and warranty of title by a dealer,
showing the names and addresses of the transferee and of any lienholder
holding a security interest created or reserved at the time of resale and
the date of his security agreement, in the spaces provided therefor on
the certificate or as the Department prescribes, and mail or deliver the
certificate to the Department with the transferee's application for a
new certificate.
64. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964).
65. Clouse v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 344 F.2d 18, 20-21 (4th Cir.
1965).
66. Id. at 22.
21
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This might make it appear that possibly the two decisions are
not so much in conflict were it not for the court's statement in
Grain Dealers that:
We have no statute which makes void transfers or sales of
motor vehicles which are not made in compliance with the
terms of the Title Certificate law. Therefore, title to a
motor vehicle passes to a purchaser notwithstanding the
want of compliance with the Title Certificate law. 7
In view of this language, it seems logical to assume that if the
South Carolina Supreme Court had been presented with the
question which arose in C/louse under section 46-150.16, it would
have held for the defendant finding legal ownership in the
buyer and therefore no ground on which to charge the seller's
insurance carrier with liability.
IV. OMNmus CLAUsE CASES
During the period surveyed, suits arising out of claims made
under the omnibus clause of liability policies came before both
the South Carolina Supreme Court08 and our Federal District
Court.69 The South Carolina rule in this area was well estab-
lished by two earlier cases.70 This rule is in essence that to bring
a person within the coverage of the omnibus provision as an
additional insured, it must first be determined that at the time
and place of the accident, the persons had express or implied
permission to use the automobile, and that the permission origi-
nated in the language or conduct of the named insured or some-
one with authority to bind him in this respect. The rule must
be applied to varied factual situations, but in the recent cases
surveyed it was not changed to any notable extent.
Worthy of note is the fact that there are other jurisdictions
which apply the "hell or high water rule" that permission for
one use is permission for all or any use. Therefore, regardless
of what the user was doing at the time of a collision or other
67. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Julian, 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685
(1965) (Emphasis added.)
68. Crenshaw v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 246 S.C. 549, 144 S.E2d 810
(1965) ; Montgomery v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 46, 145
(1965) (Emphasis added.)
69. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wiley, 251 F. Supp. 577 (D.S.C.
1966).
70. Eagle Fire Co. v. Mullins, 238 S.C. 272, 120 S.E.2d 1 (1961); Rake-
straw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 217, 119 S.E.2d 746 (1961).
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occurrance, if he was driving with initial permission from the
named insured, he would come within the ambit of coverage
provided by the omnibus clause.71
One case involving the omnibus clause that is worthy of par-
ticular note is Americanl n. Co. v. Durdei92 which is actually
more important because it deals with the problem of excess
insurance. The First National Bank of South Carolina repos-
sessed a car, then through an agent bought the car at public
auction. Durden, a bank employee, had trouble with his own
car and was allowed to take the repossessed car for the weekend
for his personal use. During this weekend, Durden was involved
in a collision with an uninsured motorist who was charged with
reckless driving. The problems in this case arose out of the fact
that Durden had an insurance policy which provided him with
uninsured motorist protection and contained an "other automo-
biles" clause. In addition, the bank, Durden's employer, had
insurance on its automobiles containing both uninsured motorist
protection and an omnibus clause insuring those who drive the
insured automobile with permission from the bank. Thus there
were two insurers, both of whom forsaw this possibility; there-
fore, each had clauses in the policy which applied to "excess"
or "other" insurance. Durden's policy provided: ":However, the
insurance shall be excess insurance over any other valid and
collectible insurance with respect to (1) temporary substitute
automobile or a non-owned automobile. .... M3
Thus this policy purported to be only excess insurance. The
bank's policy provided:
If the insured [driver covered under omnibus clause] has
other insurance against a loss covered by this policy the
company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability
stated in the declaration bears to the total applicable limit
of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against
such loss .... 74
71. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 Atl. 866
(1924); Stovall v. New York Indem. Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W.2d 473
(1928).
72, 249 F. Supp. 750 (D.S.C. 1965).
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Under this provision the insurer would pro-rate his coverage
on the basis of the total of all valid and collectible insurance
against the loss.
In the declaratory judgment action brought before the court,
the bank's insurer's contention was that the policy in no way
provided coverage because there was an exclusion in its policy
which applied to repossessed automobiles which were put to
personal use. The court quickly disposed of this contention
holding that the automobile ceased to be repossessed and became
"owned" when the bank's agent purchased it for the bank at
public auction.
The next problem was the more difficult one of which insurer
was primarily and which was secondarily "on the risk." The
court pointed out that there were no South Carolina decisions
on this problem but cited an excellent opinion by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.7r That case was similar to the one
at bar in that the owner's (in that case lessor's) insurer had a
pro rata "other insurance" clause in case there was other valid
and collectible insurance, while the driver's (lessee's) insurer
purported to insure for only the excess in case there was such
other insurance. The court held that the owner-lessor's insurer
afforded primary coverage and that the driver-lessee's insur-
ance would have to afford coverage only if the other insurance
protection, when fully exhausted, left a deficiency.
The court in Durden also declared that the owner's insurer
was primarily liable and, quoting from Appleman's work on
Insurance Law to point out that the "excess" and "pro rata"
clauses were not in conflict, said:
It has been held that where the owner of an automobile or
truck has a policy with an omnibus clause, and the addi-
tional insured also has a non-ownership policy which pro-
vides that it shall only constitute excess coverage over and
above any other valid, collectible insurance, the owner's
insurer has primary liability. In such case, the liability of
the excess insurer does not arise until the limits of the col-
lectible insurance under the primary policy have been ex-
ceeded. It should be noted that under this rule the courts
give no application to the other insurance clauses in the
primary policy, which provides that if the additional in-
75. American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958).
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sured has other valid and collectible insurance, he shall not
be covered by the primary policy. That is because the
Insurance under the excess coverage policy is not regarded
as other collectible insurance, as it is not available to the
insured until the primary policy has been exhausted. Or,
to put it another way, a non-ownership clause, with an ex-
cess coverage provision, does not constitute other valid and
collectible insurance within the meaning of a primary policy
with an omnibus clause.
76
Thus the court found no real conflict between the pro rata
and excess clauses, because under the law applicable to this
situation the pro rata clause in the primary (or owner's) policy
is disregarded, and the excess clause in the secondary policy
controls the situation.
7 7
V. HEALTH AND ACCIDENT AND LimE INSURANCE
In Schneider v. Travelers Ins. Co.78 an insured plaintiff was
totally disabled on October 12, 1957, and received full benefits
at the rate of 250 dollars per month from December 12, 1957,
through May 27, 1958. On the latter date, the plaintiff, with the
advice and consent of his doctors, took a clerical job on a trial
basis. The insurer was notified of this fact and on May 27 paid
the plaintiff 125 dollars for the fifteen day period May 12-27.
The parties both understood that the payments would cease
while the plaintiff was able to work. After this date the plain-
tiff paid no more premiums on the policy. The plaintiff kept
the job for ten months and then was discharged because he could
not satisfactorily perform the work required of him due to the
injuries and their after effects. He notified the defendant and
demanded resumption of the benefits. The insurer refused on
the grounds that: (1) the plaintiff was no longer permanently
disabled, (2) the final payment made to the plaintiff had been in
full satisfaction of any debt owed him and (3) the plaintiff had
forfeited his rights in the policy by not keeping up the pre-
miums during the time he was working and the policy had
76. 8 APPLEMAN, INSUIrANcE LAW AND PRACTicE § 4914 (1962). (Emphasis
added.) The court in American Surety also cited this as authority and cited a
number of cases from other jurisdictions as well.
77. For an excellent discussion of the "other insurance" problem, see Wat-
son, The Other Insurance Dilemma, 518 INs. LJ. 151 (1966).
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lapsed as of January 1, 1958. The lower court had granted the
defendant-insurer a nonsuit. On appeal the defendant's con-
tentions were as set out above, but the supreme court reversed.
As to the respondent's first contention, the court cited a strik-
ingly similar case79 and held that the issue of permanent dis-
ability should have been submitted to the jury. As to the second
contention, the court held that at the time the 125 dollars was
paid to the plaintiff, this was all that was legally owed him and
there was no disputed claim. Since there was no disputed claim
there could have been no compromise or settlement of such, and
consequently, there was no consideration for the alleged release
of defendant from further liability. The court stated: "It has
been soundly held that where an insurance company pays only
what is then due under its policy as an indemnity for disability,
a release from liability for any future claim under its policy
is invalid for want of consideration."8 10
As to the respondent's second contention, the court, relying on
settled authority,81 held that if the plaintiff had been disabled
before January 1, 1958, as he undoubtedly was, and the disa-
bility continued after that date, as it undoubtedly did, the
alleged lapse of the policy would have no effect on the insured's
obligation to make the prescribed payments.
In the case of Hood v. Security Ins. Co.8 2 the plaintiff, a
radiologist, had applied for a policy of disability insurance on
October 1, 1962; the policy had been issued on November 1 with-
out a medical examination. On December 1, 1963, the policy
lapsed but was reinstated on December 10. When applying for
reinstatement the plaintiff was asked if he was in good health
as of that date; he answered yes. He was subsequently disabled
by a brain hemorrhage for which he claimed compensation.
The defendant denied liability on the ground that the plaintiff
had made fraudulent misrepresentations and had concealed ma-
terial facts when he applied for the insurance and in the appli-
cation for reinstatement of the policy. It appeared that during
October 1962 the plaintiff had become aware of a suspicious
mole on his back which he found in November to be malignant.
79. Mann v. Travelers Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 198, 179 S.E. 796 (1935).
80. Schneider v. Travelers Ins. Co., 246 S.C. 240, 250, 143 S.E.2d 449, 454
(1965). Accord, Moore v. Maryland Cas. Co., 150 N.C. 153, 63 S.E. 675
(1909) ; Sutton v. Continental Cas. Co., 168 S.C. 372, 167 S.E. 647 (1933).
81. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Calloway, 54 Ga. App. 863, 189 S.E.
545 (1936); 1A APPLEMAX, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 644 (1962).
82. 247 S.C. 71, 145 S.E.2d 526 (1966).
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The plaintiff was treated for this cancer and according to
attending physicians was cured. The defendant contended that
plaintiff's answer to the question in the application for rein-
statement regarding the state of his health was false and made
with intent to deceive. From a judgment in the lower court
for the insured, the defendant appealed. It contended that even
though the reinstatement application covered only the ten day
period from the lapse date, that it was the duty of the respond-
ent to disclose the fact that he had been treated for cancer in
order that it could determine whether the respondent was in
fact in good health, and that his failure to do so was fraudulent
concealment.
The supreme court, in affirming the judgment below, defined
the term "good health" 3 as applicable here, and stated that the
respondent was asked only for his opinion as to the state of his
health. It further pointed out that the reinstatement applica-
tion only inquired as to the existence of any sickness that the
respondent might have suffered since the lapse of the policy,
and under previous cases8 4 noted that "insurers failure to in-
quire into facts it considers material to the risk prior to issuance
of the policy estops insurer to object to applicant's concealment
unless the concealment is tainted with fraudulent intent."8 15
The court, relying on a recent South Carolina case, 6 further
held that, under the facts, mere silence on the part of the in-
sured is not considered a concealment that voids the policy.
The case of Coker v. United Ins. Co. of Amerka 17 involved
a suit for death benefits under a life insurance policy issued to
plaintiff's deceased husband. The insurer had refused payment
on the ground that within two years prior to the issuance of the
policy, the deceased had been treated for cirrhosis of the liver,
but that he had not disclosed this material fact. The clause
relied on by the defendant insurer provided:
If the insured ... within two years before the date hereof
has received institutional, hospital, medical or surgical
83. The court defined good health as used in a life insurance policy as
meaning "that the applicant has no grave, important or serious disease, and is
free from ailment that seriously affects the general soundness and healthful-
ness of the system." Id. at 79, 145 S.E.2d at 530.
84. Graham v. Aetna Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 108, 132 S.E.2d 273 (1963). See
Dixon v. Standard Mlut. Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 241, 33 S.E.2d 516 (1945).
85. Hood v. Security Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 71, 79, 145 S.E.2d 526, 531 (1966).
86. Graham v. Aetna Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 108, 132 S.E2d 273 (1963).
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treatment or attention and the insured or any claimant
under this policy fails to show that the condition occasion-
ing such treatment or attention was not of a serious nature
or was not material to the risk, then in any case heretofore
mentioned within two years from the date of this policy
* . . the Company may declare this policy void either before
or after death of the insured unless such case is waived by
the Company in an endorsement on the policy, and the lia-
bility of the Company in case of such declaration shall be
limited to the return of the premiums paid on the pol-
icy .... 88
It appears from the evidence that the deceased had been treated
in a hospital for cirrhosis of the liver within two years prior to
the issuance of the policy and that he had died within two
years after the date of issuance from the same malady. The
lower court had overruled plaintiff's demurrer to the defend-
ant's answer and from that judgment she appealed. The South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed noting that in previous
cases89 they had approved policy provisions similar to the
"voidable clause" here in question and that the insurer was
entitled to void the policy under the facts presented.
WAYNE S. TDrEMrMAN
88. Id. at 274, 146 S.E2d at 867 (Emphasis added.)
89. The court upheld similar clauses as valid and enforceable in the absence
of a conflict with statutes in the cases of Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
206 S.C. 139, 33 S.E.2d 384 (1945); Weston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
206 S.C. 128, 33 S.E.2d 386 (1945) ; Grant v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 194
S.C. 25, 9 S.E.2d 41 (1940).
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